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INTRODUCTION
Climate change and the weather disasters to which it contributes
are major challenges for urban governance.
The impact of
Superstorm Sandy on New York City (the “City”), resulting in loss of
life, substantial property damage, evacuation of critical health care
facilities, flooded infrastructure, and an extended period of power
outage, required an extensive response from the City.1 Using New
York City’s experience with Superstorm Sandy as a launching point,

*

Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law.
1. See THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT–
DISASTER RECOVERY: PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A 1 (2013) [hereinafter N.Y.C.
CDBG-DR PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/
downloads/pdf/cdbg-dr_full.pdf.
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this Article addresses the fundamental question of urban governance
that weather disasters present. Recognizing the direct and immediate
connection local government bears to coastal land, infrastructure, and
the people who live and work within its borders, the role of a
municipality in preparing for and responding to weather disasters is
clear. However, although the effects of extreme weather typically are
experienced locally, the conditions that contribute to climate change
are global in scope. The enormity and complexity of weather-related
disaster preparedness limit the capacity of any individual local
government to cope with these phenomena.
To consider the governance challenge in the context of weather
disasters, Part I of this article contextualizes the question by providing
an overview of New York City’s principal pre-Superstorm Sandy
climate change mitigation measures under the administration of
former Mayor Michael Bloomberg. It then examines, in Sandy’s
aftermath, the City’s commitment to a set of initiatives to develop
capacity to withstand future weather events.2 It first considers the
City’s set of initiatives in relation to the governance structure in the
United States that serves as the source of authority, policy guidance,
and fiscal support for confronting the challenges of climate change.
The structure of governance encompasses multiple levels of
government in a hierarchical, vertical relation, operating at
successively “higher” territorial and jurisdictional scales in relation to
a city.3 Thus, in the United States, we routinely think of a city’s
climate-change initiatives within the larger context of federal and
state government programs and policies, as well as regional
governance schemes wherever they happen to exist, that address the
impact of weather-related harms.
The balance of this Article explores an alternative approach for
addressing climate-change challenges that links urban governments
horizontally, across national borders.4 Specifically, Part II introduces

2. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, A STRONGER,
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 7 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/
report/report.shtml; Annie Karni, Bloomberg Lays Out Post-Sandy Strategy, CRAIN’S
N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20121206/
REAL_ESTATE/121209942.
3. See NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE
RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 8–11 (2004).
4. See infra notes 34, 56, 134, 147–48, and accompanying text addressing features
of interurban cooperative networks, which sociologist Neil Brenner refers to as “new
state spaces,” in the distinct context of urban locational policies driving capitalism in
Western Europe. These Western European networks nonetheless suggest models
with respect to governance and scale that are useful in analyzing the potential of
transnational networks for developing resilient strategies to address climate change.
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the interurban networks, which are a set of arrangements bearing
some family resemblances to other networks, both public and private,
in the sense that they are information-driven and embrace
collaborative approaches to problem solving.5 They operate within a
normative framework established by international protocols.6 This
Part focuses attention principally on the foundational assumptions
grounding three networks of cities: the C40 Cities Climate Leadership
Group, an organization of large cities in partnership with the World
Bank, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
(ICLEI)—Local Governments for Sustainability, and a number of
philanthropic organizations;7 Rockefeller Foundation-initiated
resilience networks;8 and Resilient Cities, an annual global forum
initiated in 2010 by ICLEI, the World Mayors Council on Climate
Change, and the City of Bonn, Germany.9
Part III discusses the concomitant possibilities for comparative
urban governance of these transnationally connected cities. This Part
draws on the literature of network governance models that proliferate
information in the service of flexibility, problem solving, and
development of best practices, that typically involve devolution from
the national to a local scale, and entail voluntary compliance with
network-generated norms.10 It considers how these networks can
offer a framework for comparative governance by serving as a
continuing reference point on climate change, and a basis for

5. See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary
Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 22, 30–31 (2008), cited in Paul
Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private Monitoring of Labor
Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and Apparel
Industry/CSC9000T, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 50 n.7 (2011); Richard B. Stewart,
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448–49
(2003); see also Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care
Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 148–50 (2006).
6. See generally International Framework for Addressing Adaptation,
ACCCRN,
http://www.acccrn.org/uccr/international-framework-addressingadaptation (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
7. See Our Partners & Funders, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/partners (last
visited Aug. 4, 2014).
8. See About the ACCCRN Network, ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/aboutacccrn (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
9. See About the Global Forum, RESILIENT CITIES, http://resilientcities.iclei.org/resilient-cities-hub-site/about-the-global-forum/ (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
10. See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 5, at 30, 38–39; see also Trubek, supra note 5,
at 148–50; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 388, 396, 425–26
(2004), cited in Harpur, supra note 5, at 50 n.4.
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generating shared norms for developing resilience to climate-change
effects.
Specifically, Part III addresses ways in which interurban initiatives
such as C40 Cities and Resilient Cities make cities more salient, by
recognizing the crucial role that cities play both as contributors to
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus global warming, and as loci of
innovation, experimentation, and creativity.11
It develops the
argument that these collaborative networks exemplify an alternative
approach to governance in which cities are linked together
horizontally to commit to innovation, promote policy diffusion
through the exchange of ideas, expertise, and resources, and adopt
best practices for climate-change mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Part IV takes up potential limitations upon the discussed
conception of comparative governance. The limitations include the
enduring pro-growth orientation of cities, which may militate against
city-led climate-related resilience strategies, referred to as “managed
coastal retreat,”12 that entail scaling back waterfront development.
Another consideration is that cities’ climate, geography, and economy
will vary, and in any given instance a city’s experience may not be
replicable in other contexts.13 This Part also takes up the concern that
highly influential non-state actors engaged in international
development or philanthropy may eclipse the role of local
governments and reinforce paternalism vis-à-vis less resourced
localities.14 To address the first concern, this Article refers to
countervailing considerations of costs and incentives that could
moderate the force of the urban growth imperative. Responding to
the second concern, the Article notes how networks can be formed in
ways that emphasize commonalities among member cities. It also
addresses potential domination by powerful non-state actors with
reference to the centrality of local governments’ participation in these
networks.

11. See What is Urban Climate Change Resilience?, ACCCRN,
http://www.acccrn.org/uccr/what-urban-climate-change-resilience (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
12. See generally ANNE SIDERS, COLUMBIA CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW,
MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT
AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS (2013), available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Fellows/Managed
CoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf (analyzing managed retreat measures).
13. See CDP, PROTECTING OUR CAPITAL: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
IN CITIES CREATES A RESILIENT PLACE FOR BUSINESS 17 (2014), available at
https://www.cdp.net/CDPResults/CDP-global-cities-report-2014.pdf.
14. See Burris et al., supra note 5, at 19–21.
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Noting the general benefits that cities can derive from a problem
solving approach responsive to, but not limited by, individual cities’
experience and scale, this Article concludes that cities’ participation
in transnational urban networks holds some promise from a
comparative governance perspective. To the extent that these
interurban networks can promote members’ voluntary participation
in, and adherence to, developing norms and practices for addressing
climate-related risks, they enhance transnational problem solving on
an issue that is simultaneously local and global. Further, they raise
the possibility that local-level innovation of climate-related measures
falling within the scope of local authority can jumpstart the stalled
process of developing wider consensus on climate change that has
eluded efforts of governments at the national scale.
I. NEW YORK CITY AND WEATHER DISASTER: ADDRESSING
CLIMATE CHANGE IN A SCHEME OF VERTICAL GOVERNANCE
This Part will consider the governance implications of the pressing
climate- and weather-related challenges that a major U.S. coastal city
such as New York faces. The New York case study, despite its local
context, is used to demonstrate how climate change, as well as the
weather disasters to which it contributes, present urban governance
challenges that are global in scope. Recognizing the broad scope of
the problem, this Article considers the benefits of a broader
framework and a comparative approach, an approach this article
refers to as horizontal urban governance.
A municipality is the first line of defense in preparing for weather
disasters, given the relationship a local government bears to land use,
infrastructure, and public health and safety. Drawing on the example
of New York City, this Part examines the City’s recent engagement
with climate-change risks and its embrace of resilience strategies15
within the context of a vertical, hierarchically organized governance
scheme for addressing extreme weather events. Cities occupy a
subordinate position within the hierarchical structure in relation to a
state and national government; they operate within a single national
frame rather than comparatively and transnationally.
A critical geographic fact that New Yorkers themselves may lose
sight of is that New York has 520 miles of waterfront.16 Superstorm
Sandy, which struck New York City on the evening of October 29,
2012, reached properties, residents, and infrastructure in the City’s

15. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2.
16. See N.Y.C. CDBG-DR PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 1, at 3.
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five boroughs beyond the Zone subject to an evacuation order,
flooding many of the city’s subways and tunnels. The storm’s toll
included forty-three deaths and the total loss of approximately 300
homes; left 800,000 New York residents and businesses without
power; caused the evacuation of five hospitals and thirty residential
facilities that sustained flooding damage and power failures; and
placed 6800 persons forced to evacuate their homes in seventy-three
city shelters.17 The storm’s impact on fuel terminals, pipelines, and
fueling stations led to fuel shortages requiring rationing.18 It
produced some 700,000 tons of refuse, extensive damage to
boardwalk and waterfront structures, and the loss of more than two
million cubic yards of sand from city beaches.19
Property damage from Sandy included 402 buildings covering
35,000 units owned by the New York City Housing Authority
(NYCHA); more than 80,000 residents of NYCHA-owned high-rise
buildings, including the elderly and infirm, were stranded without
essential services following the flooding of basements in which
heating and electrical systems were located;20 heat, hot water, and
electric power were fully returned to all NYCHA buildings on
November 18, nearly three weeks after the storm struck.21 Even a
year later, reports persisted that storm-related leaks and mold growth
in public housing units were not remedied.22 This sense of continuing
vulnerability to the effects of weather-related risk is the kind of
evidence that has contributed to the characterization of New York as
“two cities,” differentiated by the extent to which its residents have
access to resources.23

17. LINDA I. GIBBS & CASWELL F. HOLLOWAY, NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER
ACTION REPORT 8, 16, 18 (2013).
18. See id. at 21.
19. Id. at 18–23.
20. See FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, SANDY’S EFFECTS
ON HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 4–5 (2013).
21. See GIBBS & HOLLOWAY, supra note 17, at 20.
22. See Mireya Navarro, Public Housing Residents Relying on Agency Still
Recovering from Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/30/nyregion/public-housing-residents-relying-on-agency-still-recoveringfrom-storm.html.
23. E.g., Ed Pilkington, De Blasio Vows Action on Inequality to Tackle New
York’s ‘Tale of Two Cities’, GUARDIAN, Jan. 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jan/01/bill-de-blasio-mayor-inauguration-new-york; Sam Roberts, Poverty
Rate Is Up in New York City, and Income Gap Is Wide, Census Data Show, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/nyregion/poverty-rate-incity-rises-to-21-2.html.
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In the years before Sandy struck, the mayoral administration of
Michael Bloomberg launched a number of initiatives that focused
attention on climate risk. In 2007, New York had introduced a
sustainability blueprint, PlaNYC 2030, in which the City planned for
population growth and targeted climate change as a significant
challenge.24 Updated in 2011, PlaNYC committed the City to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the resilience of the
City’s structures, communities, and natural systems, improving the
City’s preparedness for extreme weather, and taking other steps to
limit the harmful effects of climate change.25
In 2008, with funding provided by the Rockefeller Foundation,
Mayor Bloomberg assembled the New York City Panel on Climate
Change, which is an advisory body of climate science, legal, and risk
management specialists designed to function similarly to the
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change by providing projections
and technical analysis of climate-change risks.26 The following year
the panel reported as “extremely likely” a mean annual sea-level rise
in New York of between two to five inches by the 2020s and a mean
annual rise of between seven to twelve inches by the 2050s.27 In 2011
the City produced a comprehensive waterfront plan,28 which included
the goal of developing strategies for the City to improve its resilience
to changing climates and rising sea levels.29 Concomitantly, the City
identified specific projects, including strategic planning, data

24. See Sustainability, PLANYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/
theplan/the-plan.shtml (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
25. See PLANYC, CLIMATE CHANGE: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK 151
(2011), available at http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/planyc_2011_
planyc_full_report.pdf.
26. See N.Y.C. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 3–4
(2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2009], available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf. In 2012, the City adopted
legislation constituting the NPCC as a continuing entity with responsibilities linked,
in part, to the release of the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. See N.Y.C. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK
INFORMATION 2013: OBSERVATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS, AND MAPS 7
(2013) [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013], available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/npcc_climate_risk_information_2
013_report.pdf.
27. See CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2009, supra note 26, at 3. In June 2013,
however, the Panel on Climate Change released a report revising and increasing its
earlier projections of sea level rise. See CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013, supra note
26.
28. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY
COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN (2011), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/pdf/cwp/vision2020_nyc_cwp.pdf.
29. Id. at 105–13.
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assessment, piloting physical measures to increase coastal resilience,
zoning and building code changes, community-level planning, and
emergency preparedness efforts.30
The impact of Superstorm Sandy drew attention to the fact that
even a well-resourced city that had become proactive in gathering
data and planning for climate change was not fully prepared for the
extent and effect of sea-level surges and inundation on coastal areas
and the city’s infrastructure. A road map of “coping strategies” that
had in fact been suggested for the city and region in a 2011 study
conducted at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia
University seems, in retrospect, prescient:
The uncertainty of the exact increment of risk due to sea level rise
and global warming can therefore not serve as an excuse to avoid
dealing with the region’s storm surge risk. The coping strategies to
be explored are likely to include a mixture of modern engineering
solutions, regulatory measures, taxation and/or financial or
insurance discounting, and—as the ultimate tool—innovative land
use combined with buyouts and relocations. Costs and benefits of
these various options, including the mounting costs of not facing
these issues at all, need to be addressed quantitatively in
forthcoming studies. They could not be resolved in this initial phase
of assessment. This assessment does however clearly show the
magnitudes of problems that will need to be tackled.31

In the aftermath of Sandy, the City established a Special Initiative
on Rebuilding and Resiliency to pursue such strategies, and in June
2013 issued A Stronger, More Resilient, New York, outlining over
250 initiatives that seek to improve the City’s ability to withstand the
effects of storm surges linked to sea-level rise.32 Also in 2013, the
City’s Panel on Climate Change updated its 2009 sea-level rise
projections.33
In these post-disaster responses to weather-related risk, the City
has acted within the larger context of federal and state government
programs and policies instituted at “higher” territorial and

30. Id. at 112–13.
31. KLAUS H. JACOB ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND A GLOBAL CITY: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN EAST COAST (MEC) REGION 4 (2011), available
at http://metroeast_climate.ciesin.columbia.edu/reports/infrastructure.pdf.
32. N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2.
33. The Panel announced mid-range projections of between four and eight inches
by the 2020s, with a high estimate of eleven inches, and by the 2050s, mid-range
projections of between eleven and twenty-four inches, with a high estimate of thirtyone inches. CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013, supra note 26, at 14–16.
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jurisdictional scales in relation to the City.34 These include the New
York State 2100 Commission’s preliminary report addressing ideas to
improve the resilience of New York State’s infrastructure,35 and the
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, chaired by former Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun Donovan, a nascent
regional governance arrangement.36
These levels of government have a role to play in shaping the City’s
efforts both to mitigate and adapt to the impact of weather-related
harms, by (1) providing financial assistance, technical expertise, and
crucial data, (2) approving City proposals that are linked to that
assistance, and (3) serving as a source of policy guidance. For
example, the City received $1,772,820,000 under the federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s first distribution
of Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Relief (CDBGDR) funds.37 The City was required to (and did) obtain approval
from the federal government for its plans to use these funds for
housing, business recovery, infrastructure, and resilience
investments.38 In addition to this allocation of CDBG monies, the
34. BRENNER, supra note 3, at 8–11; see also Jacob Alderdice, Impeding Local
Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 463–65 (2013) (noting the limits on local governments’
powers to effectuate policy innovation inhering in the varying scope of local home
rule powers and authority among states to preempt local action); Richard C.
Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local
Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2556, 2563–64 (2006) (arguing
that in the United States local governments are “subservient” to federal and state
governments in the vertical structure created under federalism, which restricts the
efforts of cities to achieve public policy goals). But see Richard Briffault, Home Rule
and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1 (2006) (pointing to successful
examples of local legislation concerning government structures and electoral
procedures, and arguing that these measures can serve as local “laboratories” for
policy developments that are potentially national in scope).
35. NYS 2100 COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE STRENGTH AND
RESILIENCE OF THE EMPIRE STATE’S INFRASTRUCTURE 139 (2013), available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/documents/NYS2100.pdf.
36. HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY
REBUILDING STRATEGY: STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 36–37
(2013),
available
at
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?
id=hsrebuildingstrategy.pdf (recommending regional coordination of infrastructure
planning and strengthening). See generally id. at 49–83.
37. Mireya Navarro, City to Begin Distributing Storm Aid This Summer, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/nyregion/city-plans-todispense-nearly-2-billion-in-hurricane-aid-starting-this-summer.html?_r=0. The City
allocated $1.77 billion for Hurricane Sandy recovery, including $648 million for
housing programs, $293 million for business programs, $360 million for infrastructure
and other City services, and $294 million in resilience investments. Id.
38. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2,
at 402.
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City has had access to other federal funding, including grants from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Small Business
Administration Disaster Loans, and National Flood Insurance
Program disbursements. However, with the funding comes the
necessity to follow federal program mandates and procedures.39
Similarly, when the City issued A Stronger, More Resilient New
York, it enumerated the federal and state agencies with which it
would be required to cooperate to receive funding, technical and
logistical support, and authority to achieve certain reforms.40 For
example, the City needs assistance and funding from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to implement various beach renourishment and
floodgate repair projects,41 review by FEMA of flood-related building
standards, FEMA’s allowance of mitigation credits for flood
insurance policyholders who undertake resilience improvements and
other changes in residential insurance policy features, and FEMA’s
authorization of a more flexible building classification in the National
Flood Insurance Program.42 To secure changes in price gouging laws
and laws regulating gasoline supply contracts, the City must call on
New York State to adopt legislation,43 reflecting limits on its home
rule authority.44
The City is also subject to planning and funding within a regional
context. In August 2013 the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force,
chaired by then HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan, issued its report,

39. E.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy
at the Grassroots: Prioritizing the Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the
Local Government Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 735–39 (2012) (discussing
fiscal federalism and the impact on local governments of decreasing levels of federal
aid).
40. N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2, at
416–34.
41. Id. at 417–18.
42. Id. at 420–21. The City is also limited in any effort to craft resiliency strategies
applicable to privately-owned multifamily residential buildings that are subject to the
requirements of state-administered rent stabilization laws, NYU FURMAN CTR., THE
PRICE OF RESILIENCE: CAN MULTIFAMILY HOUSING AFFORD TO ADAPT? 37–39
(2014),
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_ThePriceofResilience_
July2014.pdf, or to federal and state laws governing buildings subject to affordable
housing subsidies. Id. at 39–41.
43. N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2, at
423.
44. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (conferring home rule powers of local
governments); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2014) (authorizing local
governments to adopt laws in relation to their property, affairs, or government, in
addition to other enumerated powers). For a discussion of the origins and
permutations of home rule doctrine, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1—
The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–18 (1990).
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Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, A
Resilient Region,45 promoting regional coordination to infrastructure
development46 and strategies for enhancing the ability of state and
local governments to develop long-term approaches to recovery and
resilience following the storm.47
In sum, notwithstanding its initiatives in climate-change planning
and goal setting, as a municipality in a federal system New York does
not operate completely autonomously in responding to weather
disaster or in developing climate-change resilience strategies. Rather,
the formal legal structure of local governments in the United States,
vis-à-vis states and the federal government, positions a city as
subordinate to governments that subsume it territorially,
jurisdictionally, and politically; cities responding to disasters engage
federal and state agencies for aid without any presumption of
leverage or entitlement.48 Referring to this structure, Richard
Schragger has observed that “cities and their leaders are three levels
down the political food chain and must normally ask the states for
whatever powers they have or wish to exercise.”49
Schragger argues that the constraints on cities inhere in the formal
separation of federal, state, and local government authority, which
can limit a local government’s ability to shape policy.50 These
constraints also implicate the “vertical competition” among federal,
state, and local officials for recognition and loyalty among local
constituents, where the interests among these governmental
representatives are not necessarily congruent.51 Certainly, as Richard
Briffault has observed, the actual scope of local authority is variable
and difficult to assess, “reflecting an ever-shifting mix of state
delegation and oversight, the vagaries of judicial interpretation,
fluctuations in the local capacity to initiate measures, the strains of
interlocal conflict and the changing economic, social and
technological dimensions of the problems local governments are

45. HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, supra note 36.
46. See id. at 49–83.
47. Id. at 129–41.
48. Schragger, supra note 34, at 2562 (discussing difficulties encountered by New
Orleans’ Mayor Nagin after Hurricane Katrina in securing aid from higher levels of
government); see also Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 735–55 (examining the
impact on local governments of decreasing or fluctuating levels of federal and state
aid and, in the specific context of New York, the effect of state-imposed restrictions
on taxation and unfunded mandates).
49. Schragger, supra note 34, at 2545–46.
50. Id. at 2562–64.
51. Id. at 2564–68.
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called upon to address.”52 Thus, the picture is complicated, and even
recognizing the authority that cities generally wield with respect to
land use,53 the issues and impacts resulting from climate changeinduced weather disaster typically have externalities that may cause
them to be understood as multijurisdictional.
However, other governance possibilities exist and, in fact, at the
same time that New York City has acted, and at times has been
constrained, within a vertical governance scheme, it has also played
an active role in the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,54 an
alternative modality to address climate-change challenges
highlighting the role of cities as generators of policies and practices
that can spread and gain adherents among other cities.55 The next
section examines in greater detail the attributes of C40 Cities and
related interurban networks, which position urban governments
horizontally rather than vertically, linking cities in networks across
national borders.56
II. ENGAGING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL
URBAN NETWORKS
Scholars of alternative governance models emphasize that
contemporary conditions of “complexity, diversity, and particularity”
are not well served by a centralized, “one size fits all” approach to
problem solving; rather, these conditions call for a process that can
adapt to changing circumstances and call upon multiple participants
from the public and private sectors. 57 It is under these conditions that
the concept of the network has emerged as a “metaphor” to convey
the idea of a system of “distributed governance” functioning under a
variety of arrangements.58 Networks are “polycentric” and typically
52. Briffault, supra note 44, at 18.
53. Id. at 57–59. For a recent ruling by the New York Court of Appeals affirming
“the preeminent power of a locality to regulate land use,” see Cooperstown Holstein
Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, No. 130 (N.Y. 2014), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2014/Jun14/Jun14.htm (holding that towns
may prohibit hydrofracking within the borders of a municipality through local zoning
laws because state legislation did not preempt municipalities’ home rule authority to
regulate land use).
54. About C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/about (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
55. E.g., Bus Rapid Transit: Transportation Initiative, C40 CITIES,
http://www.c40.org/networks/bus_rapid_transit (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (describing
how the C40 Bus Rapid Transit Network promotes sharing of knowledge and
spreading of energy-efficient bus rapid transit across cities).
56. See BRENNER, supra note 3, at 286–94.
57. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 4–6; Stewart, supra note 5, at 448–52.
58. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 12–13.
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“regulate” through the use of “soft” law,59 setting goals and targets,
aggregating data related to outcomes, and sharing information.60
They operate at all levels of government as well as in the private
sector.61
Networks in the transgovernmental context have been described as
“fast, flexible, and decentralized,” benefiting from the absence of a
formal bureaucratic structure,62 even as others raise concerns of a
“technocratic conspiracy.”63 International law scholar Anne-Marie
Slaughter has identified categories of transgovernmental networks
that have arisen among national-level officials.64 By contrast, the
resilience networks under consideration here comprise local
government officials pursuing strategies to mitigate or adapt to
climate change, although they operate within a framework established
by international protocols, including the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.65 The recent appointment of former New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg as U.N. Special Envoy for Climate
Change and Cities66 suggests networked cities’ increasingly visible
role in global strategies to combat climate change. Bloomberg, who
also serves as President of the Board of Directors of the C40 Cities
for Climate Change network, was named to this new post specifically
to assist the U.N. Secretary-General in engaging cities to muster the
political wherewithal needed to undertake climate-change measures
and to offer ideas and strategies to the U.N Climate Summit in New
York on September 23, 2014.67
The salience of cities operating in a global context as loci for
developing increased resilience to climate change is further

59. See, e.g., id. at 4, 30, 38–39 (discussing characteristics of networks in relation
to more traditional state-centered, command–and-control modes of governance);
Trubek, supra note 5, at 149–50 (noting how soft law entails greater procedural
informality, interaction among a range of actors, “learning and feedback” through
cooperative exchange of information, and the building of consensus).
60. Trubek, supra note 5, at 148–49.
61. Lobel, supra note 10, at 375–76.
62. Id. (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government
Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001)).
63. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347–48 (2001).
64. Id. at 355–59.
65. International Framework for Addressing Adaptation, supra note 6.
66. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Appoints Michael
Bloomberg of United States Special Envoy for Cities and Climate Change (Jan. 31,
2014), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sga1453.doc.htm.
67. Id.
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highlighted by the recent formation of the Medellin Collaboration on
Urban Resilience at the conclusion of the Seventh World Urban
Forum.68 The Forum, in turn, was organized by the UN Habitat for a
Better Urban Future, the Programme for Human Settlements, which
takes a global approach to sustainable urbanism.69 The collaboration
comprises the UN-Habitat, the United Nations Office for Disaster
Reduction (UNISDR), the World Bank Group, the Rockefeller
Foundation, C40 Cities, ICLEI, 100 Resilient Cities, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Global Facility for Disaster
Risk Reduction and Recovery. All of these groups are transnational
in scope and have as their focus the city as a jurisdictional, population
settlement, or economic unit.70 With its emphasis on resilience, the
collaboration seeks to assist cities to address the effects of climate
change and respond to disaster risks. It does so chiefly by
coordinating and reconciling cities’ approaches to improving
resilience; increasing cities’ access to financing that could help protect
against vulnerability; promoting sharing of best practices among
cities; and encouraging coordinated action with urban networks.71 A
number of these priorities are part of the collaborations that are a
focus of analysis in this Part.
Specifically, this Part will consider the foundational assumptions
underpinning: (1) the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the
World Bank, ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability, and a
number of philanthropic organizations;72 (2) resilience initiatives
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation;73 and (3) Resilient Cities,

68. See Jonathan Andrews, New Global Collaboration for Urban Resilience
Announced, CITIES TODAY (Apr. 11, 2014), http://cities-today.com/2014/04/newglobal-collaboration-urban-resilience-announced/#more-4940. The World Urban
Forum hosts a biennial conference drawing attendees from national, state, and local
governments, non-governmental and community-based organizations, the private
sector, United Nations organizations, and various funders and development-fostering
bodies. It focuses on issues related to the implications of accelerated growth of cities
worldwide. WORLD URB. F., http://wuf7.unhabitat.org/theworldurbanforum (last
visited June 12, 2014).
69. UN-HABITAT BETTER URB. FUTURE, http://unhabitat.org (last visited June 12,
2014). The program focuses on seven areas of urban study: urban legislation, land,
and governance; urban planning and design; urban economy; urban basic services;
housing and slum upgrading; risk reduction and rehabilitation; and urban research
and capacity. Id. Among its activities are the cities and climate change initiative and
the city resilience profiling program. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Our Partners & Funders, supra note 7.
73. See, e.g., About the ACCCRN Network, supra note 8.
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an annual global forum initiated in 2010 by ICLEI, the World Mayors
Council on Climate Change, and the City of Bonn, Germany.74
A. C40 Cities: Developing Metrics and Best Practices Among
Large Cities
Founded in 2005 by the former Mayor of London, the C40 Cities
Climate Leadership Group is a network of the world’s largest cities
that seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to take other
actions to decrease climate-related risk.75 That cities are gaining
greater prominence in the campaigns to reduce climate risk is based
on their substantial consumption of energy and production of
greenhouse gas emissions, the expansion of urbanized areas globally,
and the high percentage of cities located in coastal areas subject to
flooding as a result of sea-level rise.76 Working in conjunction with its
partners77 and funder organizations,78 the Climate Leadership Group
organizes networks of cities based on shared interests into seven
broad “initiative areas”: adaptation and water; energy; finance and
economic development; measurement and planning; solid waste
management; sustainable communities; and transportation.79 An
illustrative adaptation and water initiative links to a network of delta

74. About the Global Forum, supra note 9.
75. C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/about (last visited July 10, 2014).
76. Why Cities? Ending Climate Change Begins in the City, C40 CITIES,
http://c40.org/ending-climate-change-begins-in-the-city (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
77. In addition to the Clinton Climate Initiative, partners include Arup, an
interdisciplinary professional services group that has assisted with workshops on
carbon reduction and producing reports documenting the work of C40 mayors;
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability to help develop a broadly applicable
standard for tabulating and reporting greenhouse gas emissions; World Resources
Institute, to work with ICLEI on an instrument for measuring city-level emissions;
CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) to assist in collecting and reporting
data on cities’ greenhouse gas emissions; the World Bank, to institute a metric to
facilitate cities’ measuring and reporting emissions and demonstrating progress in
qualifying for financial assistance for major projects; Siemens, a corporation engaged
in energy, healthcare, financial, and technology sectors that has helped institute a city
climate leadership competition. See Our Partners & Funders, supra note 7.
78. Funders include Bloomberg Philanthropies, Children’s Investment Fund
Foundation, an organization working to support children’s welfare in developing
nations; Realdania, a philanthropic group derived from a former mortgage credit
organization that focuses on built resources; and Siemens, also a partner providing
various kinds of support for cities’ capacity to measure their climate initiatives. See
Our Partners & Funders, supra note 7.
79. Networks: Connecting Cities on Topics of Common Interest, C40 CITIES,
http://www.c40.org/networks (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
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cities to enable these cities to share learning on climate adaptation.80
The sustainable urban development network led by the city of
Melbourne is undertaking an initiative that encompasses three
strategic projects—intervention and policy mapping, benchmarking
and goal setting, and collaborative resourcing—all of which are
designed to lead toward the establishment of green cities.81 This
group in particular signaled its intent to work with the private sector
to produce large infrastructure projects.82 C40 Cities also provides
direct assistance to cities, such as dedicated staffing and other
resources.83 The projects supported by C40 Cities are informed by
the consortium’s animating belief that, in the absence of clear
indications that intergovernmental initiatives at higher scales have
been effective, cities can drive efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and improve resilience against the effects of climate
change.84 With particular relevance to governance considerations, the
assumption behind C40 Cities is that mayors have clear accountability
to those who live and work in the cities they lead and that city-level
governments are better able to respond flexibly to changing needs
and circumstances to effectuate climate-change mitigation and
adaptation.85 To substantiate that insight, C40 Cities collected survey
data in 2011 and again in 2013 to document mayoral powers and
trends in climate actions at the city level. As former New York City
Mayor and current President of the C40 Board of Directors Michael
Bloomberg wrote in the Foreword to the 2013 survey report, cities
have the “power, the expertise, the political will and the
resourcefulness to continue to take meaningful climate action, and
are more than ever before, at the forefront of the issue of climate
change as leaders, innovators and practitioners.”86 Survey data

80. Connecting Delta Cities: Adaptation and Water Initiative, C40 CITIES,
http://www.c40.org/networks/connecting_delta_cities (last visited July 10, 2014).
81. Sustainable Urban Development: Sustainable Communities Initiative, C40
CITIES, http://www.c40.org/networks/Sustainable_Urban_Development (last visited
July 10, 2014).
82. Melbourne to Lead Global Network of Cities on Sustainable Urban
Development, CITY MELBOURNE (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.melbourne.
vic.gov.au/AboutCouncil/MediaReleases/Pages/MelbournetoleadGlobalNetworkofCi
tieson.aspx.
83. Networks: Connecting Cities on Topics of Common Interest, supra note 79.
84. ARUP & C40 CITIES, CLIMATE ACTION IN MEGACITIES: C40 CITIES BASELINE
AND OPPORTUNITIES VOLUME 2.0 5 (2014), available at http://issuu.com/
c40cities/docs/c40_climate_action_in_megacities/3?e=10643095/6541335.
85. Why Cities? Ending Climate Change Begins in the City, supra note 76.
86. Michael R. Bloomberg, Foreword to ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 3.
For example, survey data indicate that mayors have the largest degree of authority
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indicate that cities have the capacity to lead by setting broad policy
priorities and shifts that set the stage for climate actions across other
sectors, including transportation, energy, waste, and finance.87
The network operates in large part through supporting the
production and dissemination of information by and for the benefit of
its members, and thus substantiates the emphasis in the scholarship of
networks on the role of information as an instrument of governance.88
C40 Cities’ research and communications infrastructure for
disseminating new knowledge and strategies is illustrative.89 The
network conducts ongoing research, and recently embarked on a
project to study ways in which actions taken by cities can help achieve
the global commitment to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial measurements.90 The group also produces case
studies documenting the efforts of individual cities.91 C40 Cities
sponsors workshops on specific topics including bus rapid transit,
green growth, solid waste management92 and other programming to
facilitate peer exchanges in which similarly situated cities can share
information and their experience with energy efficiency practices and
over the Buildings, Water, and Community-scale Development sectors in the climate
change arena. ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 18.
87. ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 17–18.
88. See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 5; Trubek, supra note 5; Slaughter, supra
note 63, at 363–64 (noting the view that information distribution supplants more
coercive measures for achieving “policy convergence”).
89. See generally C40 Research, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/research (last
visited Aug. 4, 2014).
90. See Research Spotlight: Demonstrating City Impact on National Emissions
Reduction Targets, C40 BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/
research-spotlight-kerem-yilmaz-c40-director-of-research-projects.
91. See Case Studies, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/case_studies (last visited
Oct. 5, 2014). Examples include programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
improve energy efficiency in Seoul, Eco-mileage: A Citizen’s Participation
Programme for Protecting the Environment, C40 CITIES (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.c40.org/case_studies/eco-mileage-a-citizen-s-participation-programmefor-protecting-the-environment, lessen vulnerability to flooding from sea level rise
and high tides through a system of moveable barriers in Venice, The Mose System to
Safeguard Venice from Flooding, C40 CITIES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.c40.org/
case_studies/the-mose-system-to-safeguard-venice-from-flooding, reduce carbon
dioxide levels in transportation, Venice Integrated Mobility Plan, C40 CITIES (Apr.
17, 2014), http://www.c40.org/case_studies/venice-integrated-mobility-plan, and use
alternate energy sources in Boston, Renew Boston, C40 CITIES (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.c40.org/case_studies/renew-boston.
92. See 2nd C40 Green Growth Network Workshop, C40 CITIES,
http://c40.org/events/2nd-c40-green-growth-network-workshop (last visited Aug. 4,
2014) (green growth); C40 Bus Rapid Transit Workshop, C40 CITIES, http://c40.org/
events/c40-bus-rapid-transit-workshop (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (bus rapid transit);
Solid Waste Networks Workshop, C40 CITIES, http://c40.org/events/solid-wastenetworks-workshop (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (solid waste management).

108

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

greenhouse gas emissions.93 The network points to 2013 survey data
documenting increases in cycle share programs, rising use of LED
street lighting, and increasing adoption of bus rapid transit programs
that accommodate large numbers of passengers (spreading from
South American cities increasingly to more developed northern
cities) as evidence that its programs have been effective in promoting
circulation of data and best practices across cities.94
Based on responses to survey questions, C40 Cities and its
publication partners recently released “In Focus” reports on ten
individual cities, nine of which are C40 members, which highlighted
their accomplishments in increasing energy efficiency and addressing
climate change.95 New York City’s documented efforts to respond to
Superstorm Sandy’s devastation and to plan for future extreme
weather episodes are featured in one of the ten reports.96 Included in
the report are data on high-level physical risks the City faces as a
result of increases in the rate of sea-level rise, storm surges, hot days,
and average annual rainfall, coupled with the vulnerability occasioned
by older infrastructure.97
Since its inception, C40 Cities has held biennial mayors’ summits,
most recently in the city of Johannesburg, South Africa, where the
gathering became the occasion for interchange with the international
community’s climate-change programs.
In Johannesburg, a
substantial group of C40 mayors asked that the United Nations’ Open
Working Group on Sustainable Development goals include a specific
goal for urban areas. The Executive Secretary for the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change attended the summit and
solicited the involvement of cities in the development of national-

93. See Networks: Connecting Cities on Topics of Common Interest, supra note
79.
94. See ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 5–6. For example, survey data
show that fifty-seven percent of C40 cities that currently have, or plan to implement,
bus rapid transit systems are located in the global north. Id.
95. See C40 Cities, Research Spotlight: New Publications Highlight 10 Cities
Delivering Best in Class Climate Action Reporting, C40 BLOG (June 4, 2014),
http://c40.org/blog_posts/research-spotlight-new-publications-highlight-10-citiesdelivering-best-in-class-climate-action-reporting.
96. See generally CDP, Data Provided for the CDP CITIES 2013 REPORT: NEW
YORK CITY (2013), available at http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/
other_uploads/images/82_CDP_2013_New_York_small.original.pdf?1401861985.
This report covers the city’s governance, risks and adaptations, opportunities created
by climate change, greenhouse gas emissions at the governmental and community
levels, and strategy. Id. at 3.
97. See id. at 10–12.
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level climate-change programs.98 C40 mayors rotate on the Steering
Committee, its governance arm;99 overall leadership is provided by an
elected Chair, a position that is held for a three-year period.100 The
C40 Cities Board of Directors reviews and guides the day-to-day
management of the organization.101
B.

Rockefeller Foundation Initiatives: Promoting Multi-Sectoral
Collaborations

In the broader effort to increase knowledge and capacity about
climate change, the Rockefeller Foundation has been a leading
proponent of developing resilient systems and the need for multisectoral collaboration. In its white paper titled Building Climate
Change Resilience, the Foundation developed a definition of climate
change resilience that emphasizes its global relevance for developed
cities such as New York as well as more transitional urban areas.102 In
its recently inaugurated 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge,
the Foundation is funding a $35 million initiative to support member
cities’ efforts to develop resilience plans.103 To be eligible a city must
have a population in excess of 50,000 and an established governance
structure.104
To date, sixty-seven cities have been chosen in two cohorts to
participate in the network and will receive technical and financial
support to develop resilience plans, which the initiative defines as
“the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses and
systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds
98. See Press Release, C40 Cities, C40 Mayors Summit Demonstrates Why Cities
are Leading On Global Climate Change (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://c40production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/press_releases/images/54_Summit_all-up_
FINAL_1_5_14_9am.original.pdf?1391599813.
99. See Steering Committee, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/steering_committees
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
100. See Chair of the C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/leadership (last visited
Aug. 4, 2014) (noting rotating role of mayors acting as Chair and indicating that
mayors to date generally have served a three-year term ).
101. See Board of Directors, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/board_of_directors
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
102. ROCKEFELLER FOUND., BUILDING CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE (2009),
available at http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/c9725eb2-b76e-42eb82db-c5672a43a097-climate.pdf.
103. See Matt Chaban, Rockefeller Foundation Target: 100 Resilient Cities,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (May 14, 2013), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20130514/
REAL_ESTATE/130519952/rockefeller-foundation-target-100-resilient-cities.
104. See Katie Watkins, The Rockefeller Foundation Kicks Off Its 100 Resilient
Cities Challenge, ARCHDAILY (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.archdaily.com/541742/therockefeller-foundation-kicks-off-its-2014-resilient-cities-challenge/.
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of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.”105 Support
includes financing for cities to employ a Chief Resilience Officer and
to disseminate research and best practices.106 The incorporation of
“stresses” in the definition of resilience contemplates that conditions
that impair a city’s day–to-day functioning—such as high
unemployment, inadequate public transportation, food and water
insecurity, and pervasive violence—also threaten resilience and must
be addressed.107 The initiative identifies resilience’s key attributes:
constant learning, rapid rebound, “safe” failure, flexibility, and spare
capacity.108
Citing the rationale for setting this challenge, Foundation President
Judith Rodin has underscored a critical need for a shared problem
solving approach:
But in today’s hyper-connected world, our challenges are
distinguished by their frequency, scale, and ability to ripple over
borders and across continents. Once-in-a-lifetime storms now
threaten the Eastern Seaboard of the United States every few years.
Disasters in urban areas can impact millions of people and shut
down entire economic systems and supply chains. And whether they
are public health threats, contagions in our financial markets, or
volatile weather events, our challenges are indeed shared challenges,
and vulnerability in one area often shakes the stability of another.109

In spearheading this project, the Foundation replicated a process of
urban exchange and linking that it has fostered in the Asian Cities
Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN).
Inaugurated in 2008, ACCCRN links ten medium-sized cities in
India, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia in an effort to help them
build resilience to the effects of climate change,110 and to generate
useful knowledge that these cities can apply and share in designing
resilience strategies.111 The network draws its funding from the

105. City Resilience, 100 RESILIENT CITIES, http://www.100resilientcities.org/
resilience (last visited Aug. 4, 2014); see also About Us, 100 RESILIENT CITIES,
http://www.100resilientcities.org/pages/about-us#/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015); 100
Resilient Cities Challenge, 100 RESILIENT CITIES, www.100resilientcities.org/
pages/100-resilient-cities-challenge#/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
106. See Judith Rodin, 100 Resilient Cities, ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/100-resilient-cities.
107. About Us, supra note 105.
108. See generally City Resilience, supra note 105.
109. Rodin, supra note 106.
110. See Anna Brown, Three Keys for Protecting Mid-Sized Asian Cities,
ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/
three-keys-protecting-mid-sized-asian.
111. See generally ABOUT ACCCRN, supra note 8.
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Rockefeller Foundation and technical, strategic, and logistical input
from city and regional collaborators, including community-based
organizations, local government actors, the business sector, and
disaster relief agencies.112 Its advisory board draws representatives
from academia, research institutes, civil society, municipal
government, and international agencies.113
Similar to C40 Cities, member cities organize international
workshops, fora, and conferences to promote knowledge on urban
resilience and adaptation.114 Despite a specific aim to support
resilience approaches that benefit poor and developing populations,
the resources that ACCCRN develop relate to challenges affecting
coastal cities generally, such as public safety, housing design, building
and infrastructure protection, and public health.115 ACCCRN’s
participation in international fora highlights the insights that its
applied research has generated. For example, at the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations Community 2015 Forum, ACCRRN
identified three critical components for defending mid-sized cities
from the triad of climate change, explosive urban growth, and
vulnerability: access to adequate funding; building capacity in local
governments acting in conjunction with other partners; and fostering
cross-sectoral collaboration that includes government, the private
sector, and funders, and that promotes coordination and sharing of
information.116
C.

Resilient Cities

The Rockefeller Foundation is also a partner supporting Resilient
Cities, which brings together local government leaders and climate
adaptation specialists to discuss adaptation issues in an urban context
around the globe on such topics as urban risk, resilient urban logistics,
financing the resilient city, urban agriculture, smart infrastructure,
and others.117 This forum is a focal point of the work of the World

112. See ACCCRN Partners, ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/about-acccrn/
acccrn-partners (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
113. See Advisory Board, ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/about-acccrn/advisoryboard (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
114. See generally ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
115. See, e.g., ACCCRN Newsletter August 2013, ACCCRN, http://us6.campaignarchive2.com/?u=5e61f404aed445cfe1dbb07a9&id=94961de618 (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
116. See Brown, supra note 110.
117. About the Global Forum, supra note 9; Partners, RESILIENT CITIES,
http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/resilient-cities-hub-site/partners/ (last visited Oct. 8,
2014).
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Mayors Council on Climate Change and the Bonn Declaration of
Mayors.118 Convening annually in Bonn, Germany, the forum hosts
workshops, panel discussions, and plenary sessions that typically
showcase demonstrations and experience sharing from specific cities.
Consistent with the approach of the other networks discussed in this
section, the 2014 Forum promoted dissemination of city-generated
knowledge and experience.119 Sessions featured GIS-based120 data
analysis from Wuppertal, Germany, and Rotterdam, Netherlands, and
green infrastructure developments in the United States and Japan;
case studies from Bangladesh and South Africa on use of locallydetermined funding; and an ecosystem–based adaptation with
examples from London, Singapore, and Copenhagen. Although its
own governance structure seems looser than that of C40 Cities or
ACCCRN, the Resilience Cities Congress annually holds the Mayors
Adaptation Forum, considered the leadership component of the
program that brings together heads of local government with
technical support and collaborators.121
Each year the Forum
culminates in the Bonn Declaration of Mayors, a hortatory document
highlighting developments and prospective action to promote
resilience and sustainable development.122
Resilient Cities identifies supporting partners, sponsors (funders),
media partners, and, in addition, thirty-eight endorsing partners
comprising nine United Nations organizations, two German federal
ministries, other German and European organizations, development
institutes, scientific and research-oriented bodies, a planning
association, and environmental and conservation agencies.123 Two of
the endorsing partners are themselves associated with urban and
regional governance: the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
118. About the Global Forum, supra note 9; Partners, supra note 117.
119. See 5th Global Forum on Urban Resilience and Adaptation, RESILIENT
CITIES 2014, http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/index.php?id=773 (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
120. GIS refers to a geographic or geospatial information system, a computer
system for gathering and displaying data, drawn from such sources as satellites and
maps related to land use and location. GIS (Geographic Information System), NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
EDUC.,
http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/
encyclopedia/geographic-information-system-gis/?ar_a=1 (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
121. Mayors Adaptation Forum at Resilient Cities, RESILIENT CITIES,
http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/index.php?id=833 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
122. Id.; see, e.g., 2013 Bonn Declaration of Mayors, ICLEI, http://www.iclei.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/ICLEI_WS/Images/events/Suwon2013/Resilient_Cities_2013/
MAF2013_Bonn_Declaration_of_Mayors_Draft_20130602.pdf (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
123. Endorsing Partners, RESILIENT CITIES, http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/resilientcities-hub-site/partners/endorsing-partners/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
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of the Council of Europe, a political body dedicated to enhancing
local and regional democracy and governance in Europe,124 and the
Network for Regional Governments for Sustainable Development
(nrg4SD), an international group of subnational governments that
highlights the role of these governments in fostering sustainable
development and promotes the formulation of subnational-level
territorial policies.125
That the inhabitants, institutions, and infrastructure of local
governments face the most direct threats from extreme weather
events underscores that local actors are highly knowledgeable about
the local conditions, resources, and vulnerabilities that must be
considered in developing appropriate responses. The networks and
organized fora discussed in this Part support cities in producing
information—which they use to create, disseminate, and encourage a
shared commitment to—norms, metrics, and practices outside of the
vertical governance structures in which local governments typically
occupy a subordinate position. Part III will examine in more detail
the theory and governance implications of these networks, which
offer the possibility of an alternative approach for addressing
transnational climate–related problems. This approach is based on a
decentered126 and, more specifically, a polycentric127 modality in place
of conventional, centralized command-and-control mechanisms. In
these networks, legitimacy and efficacy must be gauged with
reference to more flexible processes that involve comparison and
sharing among multiple approaches and participants,128 and that
ultimately seek to build consensus.129
III. HORIZONTAL URBAN GOVERNANCE: TRANSNATIONAL
NETWORKS AS A COMPARATIVE GOVERNANCE SCHEME
The burgeoning scholarship of governance often obscures the
concept’s plural meanings—encompassing both government bodies
and more informal arrangements, private as well as public forms of

124. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the Guarantor of Local and
Regional Democracy in Europe, CONGRESS LOC. & REGIONAL AUTHORITIES,
http://www.coe.int/t/congress/presentation/default_en.asp?mytabsmenu=1
(last
visited Aug. 4, 2014).
125. Missions and Objectives, NETWORK REGIONAL GOV’T FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., http://www.nrg4sd.org/missions-and-objectives (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
126. Harpur, supra note 5, at 50; Lobel, supra note 10, at 381–85.
127. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 3.
128. Stewart, supra note 5, at 447–50, 451–52 (describing network-based systems in
use in the United States and the European Union).
129. Trubek, supra note 5, at 149–50.
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management.130 If governance is understood at a base level as
“organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social
system,”131 certainly the emergence of polycentric institutional
arrangements of state and non-state actors engaged in collaborative
problem solving, typically through mobilizing (collecting, reporting,
and disseminating) information, actualizes the governance-bynetwork metaphor.132
As a cross-disciplinary concept,133 the network can be analyzed
through the lens of geography in addition to its sociological, political
theory, and legal regulatory dimensions. In the context of urban
locational policies in Western Europe, sociologist Neil Brenner has
analyzed cooperative interurban networks to illustrate the ostensible
advantages and limitations of “rescaling outward.”134 Although
Brenner’s analysis has a distinct context and purpose, identifying
features in interurban networks that reinforce competition and
uneven development under capitalism,135 the horizontal, city-to-city
orientation that such networks entail is useful for this discussion. The
network concept offers an alternative way to understand urban
governance spatially and provides a basis for comparison across urban
approaches. In the language of geography, these networks constitute
“horizontal interlinkages among geographically dispersed nodal
points”; the “nodal connectivity” of networks replaces the “territorial
enclosure” of political units whose jurisdiction is defined by bounded
territory.136 These networks are envisioned as “leapfrogging” over
space,137 disrupting the idea that a city is limited by its political
territoriality.
Brenner refers to these networks in the Western European context
as “new state spaces,” but in a number of respects they appear as
latter-day variants of a centuries-old practice from an era before the
development of the nation state: their historical antecedents are

130. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471,
472 (2004).
131. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 3.
132. Id. at 4–5; Stewart, supra note 5, at 450, 452.
133. See generally Burris et al., supra note 5, at 12–44 (discussing wide-ranging
scholarship of networks).
134. See BRENNER, supra note 3, at 286–94.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 292–93.
137. Id. at 292 (quoting Helga Leitner et al., Networks, Governance, and the
Politics of Scale: Inter-Urban Networks and the European Union, in GEOGRAPHIES
OF POWER: PLACING SCALE 207 (Andrew Herod & Melissa W. Wright eds., 2002)).
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traceable to the medieval period, when merchants and then cities in
Northern Europe formed networks known as the Hanseatic League, a
mercantile and security-promoting alliance.138 Recent scholarly
analysis of the League using network theory emphasizes
characteristics of networks—“a horizontal, little formalized and
constantly changing structure . . . [that] develops around one or more
hubs or nodes”139—that are distinguishable from both hierarchical
organizations and a market structure.140 Reflecting this distinctive
structure, the networks of Hanse merchants and cities were
heterarchical—interlinked with nodes of varying densities—and at
both a local and transnational level.141
Further, as the Hanseatic trading networks expanded and gained
influence, the networks generated norms and rules that ensured
stability and a reliable basis for cooperation by setting criteria of
merchantable quality and measurement, permitting debt claims, and
recognizing individual liability.142 The network structure anchored in
the trading offices that enforced these rules also served important
coordinating and information-exchange functions.143
Network theory and the historical example of the Hanseatic
networks provide a conceptual model and a point of comparison for
transnational networks formed to promote sustainable urbanism and
initiatives to address climate change. In the context of climate-change
mitigation and adaptation strategies, various United Nations
institutions, in particular UN-Habitat for a Better Urban Future144
and the newly established Special Envoy for Climate Change and
Cities,145 look to networked cities as crucial actors in amassing
relevant knowledge, generating standards for action, and serving as
reference points for similarly situated cities.
Executive Director of UN-Habitat Joan Clos made this point at the
close of a three-day conference hosted by the United Nations

138. See, e.g., id. at 293 n.7; BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE
METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN
POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 166–68 (2013). See generally Margrit Schulte
Beerbühl, Networks of the Hanseatic League, EGO: EUR. HIST. ONLINE (Jan. 13,
2012), http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schultebeerbuehlm-2011-en.
139. Beerbühl, supra note 138, at ¶ 2.
140. Id.
141. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 46.
142. Id. at ¶ 25.
143. Id. at ¶ 28.
144. See UN-HABITAT BETTER URB. FUTURE, supra note 69.
145. Mayors on Frontline of Battle Against Climate Change—UN, UN NEWS
CENTRE (May 29, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47924.
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Economic and Social Council, on May 27–29, 2014. Specifically, Clos
cited the leading role that mayors have played in efforts to address
climate change as he announced support for a compact that various
networks, comprising thousands of cities, would sign to pledge
support for adopting climate-change resilience strategies.146 At the
same conference, United Nations Special Envoy for Cities and
Climate Change Michael Bloomberg opined that mayors’ executive
powers positioned them to move forward on climate-change efforts,
and that they “did not have to wait for Government actions.”147
Presumably the Special Envoy referred to state, regional, or national
government regulatory action under a vertical governance model,
although in actuality the extent of mayoral powers across cities, and
the form of policymaking authority that can be exercised on behalf of
cities under that model, vary.148
Reflecting the direct stake that cities have in addressing climate
risk, the networks invoked with approval under these United Nations

146. Id.
147. Id. Analogously, interurban networks have been viewed as a way to bypass
national governments in the context of local urban development in Western Europe,
as noted in Neil Brenner’s analysis. BRENNER, supra note 3, at 288.
148. Special Envoy Bloomberg’s assessment actually may apply to mayors in other
political systems more reliably than in the United States, for example in Germany
and Russia, where cities are allowed to be represented at higher levels of
government, and in France, where mayors can also occupy national office. Schragger,
supra note 34, at 2570. By contrast, in the United States, the dominant form of
mayoralty is the council-city manager system, in which the council, the legislative
body, appoints an administrator and the mayor has no real authority. Alderdice,
supra note 34, at 466; Schragger, supra note 34, at 2550. The strong-mayor
alternative is more prevalent in larger U.S. cities such as New York. Alderdice, supra
note 34, at 466; Schragger, supra note 34, at 2550. Even there, the mayor shares
power with a city council that is empowered by the City Charter to enact legislation,
adopt budgets, and exercise authority over land use. See Elizabeth Fine & James
Caras, Twenty-Five Years of the Council-Mayor Governance of New York City: A

History of the Council’s Powers, The Separation Of Powers, and Issues for Future
Resolution, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 126–35 (2013–2014). However, that is with a
mayoral veto for significant categories of land use action, including zoning map
changes, land disposition or acquisition, and urban renewal plans. See N.Y.C.
CHARTER § 197-c. Further, New York City mayors’ resort to executive orders, and
other executive agency action to effectuate policy, is not without limitation. Courts
have invalidated such orders when they determine that they trench upon legislative
policymaking authority. See Fine & Caras, supra, at 127. As a recent example, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the New York City Board of Health’s
adoption of a rule limiting the portion size of sugary beverages provided in food
service establishments constituted an exercise of lawmaking and infringed on the
legislative powers of the City Council. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 134 (N.Y. 2014),
available
at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2014/Jun14/134opn14Decision.pdf.
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auspices operate horizontally in contrast to vertical governance
schemes to promote “policy diffusion.” This governance concept
refers generally to the horizontal dispersion and adoption by other
government units of an idea or policy, typically through processes that
include gaining exposure to policy innovation, monitoring its
progress, and justifying adoption of a similar policy on the basis of its
demonstrated success and appropriateness.149 An example of policy
diffusion in the interurban climate-change context, as mentioned
above, is the recent spread of bus rapid transit programs, a policy
originating in South America and then adopted in more developed
northern cities.150
Judith Resnik’s work on translocal organizations of government
actors151 suggests productive analogies to the horizontal interurban
relationships discussed here. Resnik’s analysis notes the potential for
the organizations she describes, for example the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, to “create norms for office holders and shape policy
preferences,” to “model behavior as [translocal actors] cooperate and
pool resources,” and to serve as “conduits for border crossings- state
to state, state to federal, and international.”152 The transnational
climate-change networks similarly operate by creating norms, shaping
policy, modeling behavior, and facilitating broader dissemination and
adoption of policy related to adapting to climate risks.153

149. Alderdice, supra note 34, at 461–62 (citing Justice Brandeis’ oft-quoted
reference in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) to a subnational
state government as “laboratory” for trying out new policy approaches in the context
of U.S. federalism).
150. ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84. A recent example of urban policy
diffusion in the United States context is New York City’s adoption of a measure
authorizing cities to issue municipal identification cards, seen as benefitting
undocumented immigrants, homeless persons, and other individuals whose statuses
might otherwise be questioned. Mara Gay, New York Municipal ID Program
Approved by City Council, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/
new-york-city-council-has-approved-a-municipal-id-program-expanding-access-for500-000-illegal-immigrants-1403818740. Similar measures have been adopted in
other U.S. cities, including New Haven and Los Angeles. Id.
151. Heather Gerken and Ari Holtzblatt point to Resnik’s work in their discussion
of horizontal federalism in the U.S. context. Heather Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The
Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 60 n.7 (2014).
152. Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and
Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1132 (2008).
153. See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism,
57 EMORY L.J. 31, 50–63 (2007) (citing examples in which U.S. cities adopted
measures or asserted policy positions supporting international norms embodied in
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
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Interurban initiatives such as C40 Cities and Resilient Cities
recognize the central role that cities play both as contributors to
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus global warming, and as loci of
innovation, experimentation, and creativity.154 These transnational,
interurban networks facilitate coordination and communication
among cities and help them assemble critical financial and technical
support, essential in light of the fiscally dependent conditions in which
cities in vertical governance structures operate.155 Further, the
networks help develop cities’ capacity to disseminate knowledge and
methodologies, ideas, policy innovation, expertise, and resources, and
shape policy and problem solving on critical climate-resilience issues.
Although not a condition of network membership, a desirable
outcome for the networks is to bring about collective action among
participating cities to adopt or commit to shared norms and
practices.156
In short, resembling the interconnected Hanseatic League trading
networks and the overlapping network of cities that supported
them,157 the transnational interurban networks discussed in Part II
seek to develop norms, standards, and best practices, such as
measuring and reporting climate-change effects that, in turn, serve as
a continuing point of reference and comparison for other cities
participating in the networks. To the extent that member cities
consent to be bound by these developing climate-change resilience
standards (and assuming they are not precluded from doing so by
domestic law), the networks offer a framework for problem solvingoriented governance158 that is horizontal rather than vertical,

and the Kyoto Accord for reducing greenhouse gas emissions when national
government institutions in the United States failed to do so).
154. What is Urban Climate Change Resilience?, ACCCRN http://www.acccrn.org/
uccr/what-urban-climate-change-resilience (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
155. See Beerbühl, supra note 138.
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing UN-Habitat Executive
Director’s call for cities to sign a compact committing to climate-change resilience
strategies).
157. Beerbühl, supra note 138, at ¶¶ 31–34, 46.
158. The network model discussed here arguably bears some surface resemblances
to the global experimentalist governance (GXG) model, a process for collective
problem solving that operates transnationally, and requires the following steps: (1)
discussion among stakeholders of a shared problem; (2) development of a
“framework understanding” with aims that are not preordained; (3) adaptation of
framework norms by actors knowledgeable about local conditions; (4) assessment of
results, subject to peer review; and (5) periodic review and revision of goals and
practices based on results of peer review. Gráinne de Búrca et al., Global
Experimentalist Governance (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Research Paper No. 14-393, 2014).
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heterarchical/nodal rather than hierarchical, and comparative in
operation.
IV. ADDRESSING POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS
Before concluding, this Part surfaces and responds to potential
limitations upon this governance approach. These include the impact
of a pro-growth orientation prevalent in cities on the adoption of
climate-resilient strategies and the possibility that variable conditions
among horizontally-linked cities may not be replicable in other
contexts or serviceable to a horizontal governance model. Further,
this Part addresses concerns that well-resourced non-state
participants will dwarf the role of local government actors and,
perhaps, reinforce dynamics of dependency among cities in less
developed regions.
Scholars and commentators of urban government and policy have
long associated cities with a pro-growth ideology that elevates
business and developer preferences and initiatives over those
motivated by efforts to overcome resource inequality or that
otherwise limit the conditions under which growth that is subject to a
minimum of restraints can occur.159 The tension between pro-growth
and alternative preferences is particularly pronounced as cities turn to
resilience strategies to address climate change. For coastal cities such
as New York, waterfront development is typically tied to economic
well-being and is widely regarded as desirable.160 However, given
projections of continuing sea-level rise and increased risk of surges,
unrestrained waterfront development can pose significant costs and
risks.161

Because the model contemplates the participation of actors at multiple levels
and a more structured, systematized process for advancing its work, id., it is
distinguishable from the interurban network models discussed here, which link cities
in a range of more diffuse exchanges and collaborations. However, the steps
identified with the GXG process are, at least in their attention to problem solving,
reference to local expertise and local implementation, and peer exchanges,
compatible with key premises under which the urban climate change networks have
formed.
159. Alderdice, supra note 34, at 470–72 (summarizing theories and rationales for
cities’ pro-growth orientation).
160. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 28, at 109; N.Y.C. SPECIAL
INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2, at 7.
161. Kate Sheppard, Flood, Rebuild, Repeat: Are We Ready for a Superstorm
Sandy Every Other Year?, CITYLAB (July 29, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/
politics/2013/07/flood-rebuilld-repeat-are-we-ready-superstorm-sandy-every-otheryear/6352/.
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Developing the waterfront requires construction or extension of
infrastructure and, in turn, necessitates structural (hard) armoring
strategies162 to protect against storm surges and other weather-related
damage. Resorting to such measures is costly, requiring investment in
maintenance or replacement of these armoring structures.163 These
weather-related costs supply an economic rationale for reassessing
the growth orientation of coastal cities. As a further economic
consideration, cities seeking to balance growth and strategies of
climate resilience could offer or increase financial incentives to
promote “green” rather than waterfront development. The mutually
reinforcing effect of large numbers of cities linked in a network
committed to policies promoting sustainability and resilience could
potentially moderate the force of the growth imperative.
To address the concern that variations in the cities’ climate,
geography, and economy may preclude useful comparisons, networks
can be formed in ways that emphasize commonalities among member
cities. For example, organizing cities in terms of size, geographic
characteristics, extent of development and economic wherewithal, or
in terms of more specific policy concerns or subissues164 within the
broader ambit of climate change, can achieve more nuanced linkages
among similarly situated cities. Examples include C40 Cities, the
members of which are linked by their megacity status,165 and the
ACCCRN, in which member cities are linked by geography, medium
size, and the objective to support resilience measures for developing
populations.166
The potential problem that influential non-state actors will
dominate these networks167 points to a concern that networks lack
legal accountability.168 Particularly in light of the prominent role that
well-resourced foundations and philanthropies already play in

162. “Hard armoring” mechanisms include sea walls, bulkheads, levees, and riprap
or revetments, which entail installing large boulders or concrete structures at
shorelines. See, e.g., Megan M. Herzog & Sean B. Hecht, Combatting Sea-Level Rise

in Southern California: How Local Governments Can Seize Adaptation
Opportunities While Minimizing Legal Risk, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 463, 472 (2013).
163. Sheppard, supra note 161. Beyond the costs involved, when these protective
measures fail, coastal buildings, infrastructure, and residents are put at risk. Id.
164. See, e.g., BRENNER, supra note 3, at 287.
165. History of the C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/history (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
166. See Slaughter, supra note 63; Stewart, supra note 5.
167. See Burris et al., supra note 5, at 23.
168. Slaughter, supra note 63, at 360–66; Stewart, supra note 5, at 452.
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promoting these interurban linkages,169 one might question whether
network cities are in fact driving and diffusing innovation. Further,
that network methods replicate practices and rhetoric favored by the
private sector, including aggregating information, reliance on
feedback, and use of yardsticks and targets,170 further demonstrates
the ways in which governance has modulated the traditional role and
practices of government.171 These considerations are not easily
dismissed.
However, the central role of consortia of local
governments in these networks, including the C40 Cities mayors,
ICLEI, the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, and the
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of
Europe, suggests that participation in the networks will likely
strengthen local governments’ capacity, voice, and access to
information on climate-related issues.
An additional point to recognize is that networked cities’ authority
to adopt norms horizontally/heterarchically is subject to the
requirements of the hierarchical governance structure under which
each city also operates. These include the extent of a city’s home rule
power, noted in Part I, which is tied to the nature of the policy or
practice involved. Certainly in New York, to the extent that local
climate-change initiatives are considered regulation of land use, such
local action should in the first instance fall within the ambit of home
rule authority;172 the possibility that a preemption challenge would
succeed, however, is less predictable. Even under circumstances in
which a network-member city’s climate-change initiative were
deemed preempted by state or federal law, the city’s proactive testing
of policies and practices would have value: such local action
contributes to the body of knowledge and experience available to
other cities in the network. In addition, it provides a blueprint for,
and exerts upward pressure upon, higher levels of government in a
vertical governance scheme to move forward on useful climatechange initiatives.
CONCLUSION
A turn to transnational urban networks to generate and diffuse
climate-related norms and practices is an approach warranting further
consideration. Although the concerns identified in Part IV merit

169.
170.
171.
172.

See BRENNER, supra note 3, at 293 n.7.
Lobel, supra note 10, at 396.
See Burris et al., supra note 5, at 14–19.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2014).
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attention, the interurban network model does hold the potential to
expand participating cities’ resources and knowledge opportunities.
It increases cities’ capacity to address an issue that is simultaneously
local and global, that calls for intergovernmental and multi-sectoral
collaboration, and that has generally confounded efforts to achieve a
workable consensus at the national scale.
A problem-solving and policy-making approach that is attentive to
an individual city’s experience and scale while drawing on the shared
experience of multiple network-linked cities increases the potential
benefits of the individual city’s membership. As it moves forward
with climate-resilience initiatives, a city such as New York that
participates in transnational interurban networks can both draw from
and contribute to the knowledge and experience generated by other
cities in its cohort. This accumulated knowledge and practice can
form the basis for an alternative modality of loose or soft governance,
a framework of norms, standards, and metrics to which cities can
agree to be bound.
The use of urban networks is not a new idea or scalar arrangement,
but it alters the tendency to overemphasize vertical governance
schemes and the scale of national government. Climate-oriented
urban networks may have more initial success than other levels of
government in promoting the diffusion of guiding norms, policies, and
problem-solving practices because they foreground cities’ preeminent
knowledge of local conditions and harness their practical incentives to
develop resilient approaches. By proliferating information and
promoting comparison at the urban level, transnational urban
networks may reinvigorate efforts to build and scale up a broader
intergovernmental climate-change adaptation and resilience
consensus.

